Both clinicians and neuroscientists have been long interested in the topic of fear conditioning, with recent advances in neuroscience, in particular, igniting a shared interest in further translation between these domains. Here, we review some historical aspects of this relationship and the progress that has been made in translating the neuroscientific study of fear conditioning to the conceptualization and treatment of mental disorders, especially anxiety-related disorders. We also address some conceptual and methodological challenges faced by this research, and offer some suggestions to support future progress in the field.
INTRODUCTION
When in 1920, John B. Watson and Rosalie Rayner conditioned a young child who would become known as "Little Albert", they could not have imagined the extraordinary impact that their experiment would have in our current conceptualization of anxiety-related disorders, almost a century later. Over the past two decades, in particular, this legacy has been strengthened by the 'happy marriage' between neuroscientists and clinicians interested in the topic of fear conditioning phenomena, although it must be said, love took a while to emerge.
In this review, we will briefly reflect on some of the history of this relationship and the specific progress that has been made in translating the neuroscientific study of human fear conditioning models to the management and treatment of anxiety-related disorders (including panic disorder/agoraphobia; specific phobia; social anxiety disorder, SAD; generalized anxiety disorder, GAD; obsessive-compulsive disorder, OCD; and post-traumatic stress disorder, PTSD). We will also address some of the conceptual and practical challenges that have been faced during this process and will offer some suggestions for future research in the field. demonstrated in rodents (LeDoux, 2000) , to human fMRI has turned out to be more complicated. In the recent meta-analysis of fear conditioning fMRI studies by Fullana et al (2016) , the amygdala was not identified as consistently showing tissue activity. In contrast, in patients with amygdala lesions, impaired conditioned fear acquisition has been demonstrated (Bechara et al., 1995; Klumpers et al., 2014; K S LaBar, LeDoux, Spencer, & Phelps, 1995) .
Inconsistent translation of the animal neuroscience to human neuroimaging could of course be due to a number of methodological factors that do not necessarily call into question the role of these regions in fear conditioning in humans. For instance, failure to detect amygdala activity in fMRI could be due to well-known difficulties in signal detection from this region (e.g. Weiskopf, Hutton, Josephs, & Deichmann, 2006) . Another potential explanation comes from animal neuroscience, which shows that a relatively small number of sparsely distributed neurons respond to a fear conditioned stimulus (CS+) (Reijmers, Perkins, Matsuo, & Mayford, 2007) , which could be below what is required for detecting regional activity with fMRI. Furthermore, in addition to neurons responding to the presence of a CS+, a roughly equal number respond to the absence of a CS+ (Haubensak et al., 2010) . Because conventional fMRI applies spatial filtering ('smoothing') at a multi-voxel level, observed fMRI responses to a threat and control conditioned stimuli within the amygdala in humans might be similar. Indeed, three fMRI studies of human fear conditioning using different (multivariate) approaches and focusing on trial-by-trial activation patterns have illustrated that amygdala activity can differ between a CS+ and CS-(safety conditioned stimulus) during fear conditioning (Bach, Weiskopf, & Dolan, 2011; Staib & Bach, 2018; Visser, Scholte, Beemsterboer, & Kindt, 2013) .
Despite these caveats, animal and human experimental studies remain focused on understanding the contribution of this extended neural circuitry to distinct fear conditioning processes, including their clinical translation in studies of patients with anxiety-related disorders. Regarding the latter, a common observation in fMRI studies of such patient groups is that they demonstrate heightened activation of the anterior cingulate, insula, and less consistently the amygdala, in response to conditioned threats, when compared to healthy or trauma exposed control participants (Milad et al., 2009; Rougemont-Bücking et al., 2011; Suarez-Jimenez et al., 2019; Veit et al., 2002) .
In fMRI studies of differential fear conditioning, patient groups have also shown reduced activity in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex to cues that signal safety. Such reductions in vmPFC activity to cues signalling safety have been observed in PTSD (Jovanovic, Kazama, Bachevalier, & Davis, 2012; Milad et al., 2009; Rougemont-Bücking et al., 2011; Suarez-Jimenez et al., 2019) , GAD (Cha et al., 2014; Via et al., 2018) ; and OCD (Apergis-Schoute et al., 2017; Milad et al., 2013) . Reduced activation of the vmPFC during fear extinction learning was also shown to predict poorer response to exposure therapy in patients with SAD (Ball, Knapp, Paulus, & Stein, 2017) . Thus, while altered fear conditioning has long been suggested in the pathophysiology of anxiety-related disorders (Eysenck, 1979) , it is only more recently that altered processing of conditioned safety signals has received empirical attention, especially in the neuroscientific study of such disorders (Milad & Quirk, 2012) .
Its is important to note that the (renewed) interest in translational fear conditioning models aligns well with new approaches in mental health research that aim to develop nosological classifications that focus on neural (dys)function rather than on symptoms alone, and which can be eventually linked with personalized interventions ("precision (Anderson & Insel, 2006) .
TRANSLATING NEUROSCIENCE TO THE CLINIC
There continue to be pioneering advances in the neuroscience of learning and memory using fear conditioning models, especially in rodents. And with technological developments-such as the use of activity-dependent neural tagging and optogenetics-the fine-scale microcircuitry within and between the amygdala, hippocampus, and medial prefrontal cortex is coming into view (Janak & Tye, 2015; Krabbe et al., 2018; Tovote et al., 2015) . But an important and highly interesting question going forward is whether and how breakthroughs in the neuroscience of fear learning ultimately contribute to our understanding of, and treatment for, mental health disorders in humans. For example, how does an understanding of the molecular underpinnings of associative fear learning in the amygdala help patients suffering with PTSD? To date, much of the translation from behavioral neuroscience in rodents to treatment of humans with mental health disorders is experimental or preclinical. Like much clinical translational research, there have been periods of early excitement and promise followed by periods of disappointment.
Disrupting fear memories
One route of translation concerns adapting models of memory consolidation and reconsolidation to treat mental health disorders within a critical time window, using both pharmacological and non-pharmacological approaches (Monfils & Holmes, 2018; Schwabe, Nader, & Pruessner, 2014) . One approach is to disrupt the formation of a memory by interfering with the memory consolidation processes soon after learning (McGaugh, 2015) .
For example, direct injections of a protein synthesis inhibitor into the lateral amygdala can abolish the long-term expression of a conditioned fear memory in rodents (Johansen, Cain, Ostroff, & LeDoux, 2011) . But attempts to disrupt learning with less toxic drugs, like the beta-blocker propranolol, are extremely sensitive to the timing between learning and drug administration. Specifically, injection of the beta-blocker propranolol into the lateral amygdala before fear conditioning disrupts formation of a conditioned fear memory (Bush, Caparosa, Gekker, & Ledoux, 2010), but injection immediately after conditioning does not stop the formation of a long-term fear memory (Schiff et al., 2017) . This temporal regulation is important, because it suggests that attempts to stop a negative emotional memory from being formed will be thwarted if the drug is not already onboard when the experience occurs.
This sensitive time window for disrupting emotional memory formation might explain why attempts to interfere with memory formation soon after a trauma have met with limited or no success (Pitman et al., 2002; Sharp, Thomas, Rosenberg, Rosenberg, & Meyer, 2010 ; see also Phelps & Hofman, 2019) . From an adaptive memory framework, the propensity to retain fear associations is paramount to evolutionary survival, and hence these emotional experiences may be fiercely resistant to interference and forgetting (see Dunsmoor et al., 2018) . But from a clinical perspective, the inability to prevent the formation of emotional memories after a negative experience renders memory modification a challenging treatment strategy.
Because blocking the formation of an emotional memory may be challenging without the use of invasive and unsafe protein synthesis inhibitors, and due to the fact that most individuals seek treatment well after negative life events or traumas, another approach is to disrupt memories after they are already formed. Reactivating an old memory can, under certain circumstances, lend the memory to becoming labile and susceptible to interference during a process known as memory reconsolidation. Invasive injections of protein synthesis inhibitors into the lateral amygdala, after memory reactivation, can effectively block the reconsolidation of a fear conditioning memory (Nader, Schafe, & LeDoux, 2000) , and this has been translated to humans with oral administration of propronolol (Kindt, Soeter, & Vervliet, 2009.) Limited clinical work has tried to interfere with memory reconsolidation in PTSD by administering the beta-blocker propranolol shortly before memory reactivation, so that the drug is onboard at the time of memory reconsolidation. But results on improving PTSD symptoms have been mixed with some successes (Brunet et al., 2008 (Brunet et al., , 2018 and some negative findings (Wood et al., 2015) . A dominating concern in the memory reconsolidation literature is the tenuous effects observed without the use of invasive protein synthesis inhibitors. For instance, research using safe pharmacological approaches, like propranolol, or non-pharmacological techniques, like extinction or interference training following memory reactivation, have been inconsistent across species (e.g. Luyten & Beckers, 2017) .
Furthermore, whether a consolidated fear memory is susceptible to permanent disruption (or "erasure") remains controversial (Gisquet-Verrier & Riccio, 2018) , and the conditions by which a memory is most susceptible to interference via reconsolidation updating will be challenging to control in a clinical setting (Treanor, Brown, Rissman, & Craske, 2017) .
Moreover, even memories for single events can be expressed in different ways (subjective, physiological, etc) and each way may be linked to different neural representations, i.e., may involve a different brain system for storage and expression (Phelps & Hofmann, 2019) .
However, the molecular pathways involved in consolidation and re-consolidation, spanning from neurotransmitters, intra-synaptic signaling, and translational/transcriptional mechanisms to structural changes in the extracellular matrix (Bach, Tzovara, & Vunder, 2018; Bach et al., 2019a; Bach et al., 2019b) , are under active investigation. This may provide potential for the development of new drug targets, including repurposing of human-approved compounds (Bach et al., 2019a (Bach et al., , 2019b Ross et al., 2017; Sartori & Singewald, 2019) . Note that we have focused here on the applications to interfering with aversive memory in anxiety-related disorders, but memory interference approaches have also been used in substance use disorders on the basis that these involve pathological reward memory (Treanor et al., 2017; Paulus et al., 2019) .
Strengthening extinction memories
Because extinction is considered new learning (rather than erasure of the old memory), techniques to generally strengthen learning and memory could be levied to improve extinction-based therapies, like exposure. Thus, another method informed by the neuroscience of fear conditioning are drugs that act as putative cognitive enhancers to improve learning and memory during fear extinction training (Singewald, Schmuckermair, Whittle, Holmes, & Ressler, 2015) . One drug is d-cycloserine, a partial N-methyl-D-aspartate receptor agonist, shown in rodent studies to improve extinction memory (Davis, Ressler, Rothbaum, & Richardson, 2006; Ledgerwood, Richardson, & Cranney, 2005) , probably through enhanced extinction memory consolidation (e.g. Ledgerwood, Richardson & Cranney, 2003 , Parnas, Weber & Richardson, 2005 . Administering this drug in combination with extinction training has shown some promise in well-controlled laboratory fear conditioning experiments, and there is evidence that it augments treatment for anxiety-related disorders (Hofmann, Sawyer, & Asnaani, 2012; Rothbaum et al., 2014) . However, a recent individual patient data meta-analysis concluded that d-cycloserine indeed enhances the effect of exposure-based therapy, but the effect size was modest (Mataix-Cols et al., 2017) .
Important to note is that none of the studies established beforehand if their participants indeed suffered from extinction (consolidation) deficits, and it might well be that this process is only hampered in a subset of patients suffering from anxiety-related disorders.
Neuroscientific methods that could reliably identify individuals with such deficits would have important clinical implications and contribute towards "precision medicine" approaches.
One pitfall of the use of a putative cognitive enhancer is that a treatment session that results in heightened (rather than reduced) fear and anxiety within-session may be preferentially remembered under a drug that enhances learning and memory, thus rendering treatment counterproductive (Litz et al., 2012; Smits et al., 2013) . Thus, caution should be exercised when administering techniques that strengthen learning and memory to prevent "good" exposure therapy from going "bad" (Hofmann, Otto, Pollack, & Smits, 2014) .
Further knowledge on appropriate dosages, timing, and effects of repeated administration (e.g., tolerance) are also in need of more careful laboratory study before cognitive enhancers should be widely used in combination with behavioral treatment.
There is now emerging research using non-pharmacological neurostimulation to enhance learning and memory in the context of psychiatric treatment. A treatment form that is based on knowledge of the macroscopic functional neuroanatomy of psychopathological phenomena is repetitive transcranial magnetic stimulation (rTMS). This involves placing a strong, focal magnetic field above a certain location on the skull and thus causing an electric field in the brain tissue below. The action radius and effect of this electrical current depend on a number of factors, including the type and orientation of the coil, distance between coil and brain and the intensity, frequency and pattern of the magnetic pulse.
rTMS is now an established treatment for depression (Lefaucheur et al., 2014) and applications in anxiety-related disorders are being investigated. Mostly, rTMS is offered as a stand-alone treatment but increasingly also combinations with psychotherapy are being explored. These combinations can take various forms. Series of rTMS sessions can be offered "in parallel" over the same time period (usually a number of weeks) in which also some form of psychotherapy takes place, or both types of treatment can be offered consecutively. The most attractive option, however, is the use of rTMS during psychotherapy sessions.
Particularly exposure therapy lends itself for this option because of its proven efficacy, its highly formalized application and available knowledge on the underlying mechanisms.
Several of such (relatively small) studies have been undertaken in anxiety-related disorders, with mixed results however (Chalah & Ayache, 2019) . This unclear picture is likely due to the large variation in methods between those studies regarding the type and intensity of the rTMS applied, comorbidity, medication use and the presence and type of sham condition. A way forward here could lie in making use of the current insights in the mechanisms of therapy. Exposure therapy may rely on extinction-based memories and success of fear extinction seems important for its short and long term outcome (Lange et al. 2016 (Lange et al. , 2019 .
Moreover, it is possible that the therapy effect is subserved by an inhibiting effect of the vmPFC on the amygdala, as suggested in a recent study in healthy volunteers, were the expression of conditioned fear responses was reduced by applying rTMS to the vmPFC (Raij et al.,2018) . This study may guide future studies in several ways: The expression of conditioned fear responses was achieved by applying rTMS during extinction learning. This suggests that studies in patients may benefit from a design in which rTMS is applied "online", during an exposure therapy session rather than "offline". Further, target selection for rTMS placement was based on functional connectivity analyses. Clinical studies may also benefit from a more individual and/or disorder related target selection, based on prior connectivity analyses.
"Novelty-based" approaches
Another strategy to improve memory for extinction, over memory of the fearful experience, is to selectively enhance the consolidation of the extinction memory. One potential approach from the animal behavioral neuroscience literature involves exposing animals to novelty in limited temporal window after learning to enhance consolidation of weak memories stored in the hippocampus, a technique in line with the synaptic-tag-andcapture hypothesis (Frey & Morris, 1997) . For instance, in what is referred to as "behavioral tagging" (Moncada & Viola, 2007) , animals who undergo a poor context fear extinction session (limited time in the cage without shocks) later expressed a strong extinction memory (diminished freezing in the feared environment) if extinction was shortly followed by exposure to a novel open field (de Carvalho Myskiw, Benetti, & Izquierdo, 2013; Menezes et al., 2015) . This model has been extended to explain selective retroactive enhancement of episodic memory in humans (Dunsmoor, Murty, Davachi, & Phelps, 2015) . Whether novelty exposure improves human fear extinction memory remains to be shown, and there has been surprisingly little research attempting to translate behavioral tagging to human fear conditioning and extinction. Importantly, animal studies show that behavioral tagging effects depend on dopamine inputs into the hippocampus (Menezes et al., 2015) . Thus, behavioral tagging effects might be indirectly inferred from research using post-extinction administration of L-Dopa. That is, L-Dopa administration after extinction diminishes the renewal of fear in rats and humans (Haaker et al., 2013) . To date, these approaches have received fairly limited attention, and much more work is needed to evaluate how they could be adapted to the clinic for treatment of anxiety-related disorders. It is also important to consider whether incorporating novelty or L-Dopa as an adjunct to improve extinction memory might inadvertently strengthen fear memory, similar to inadvertent effects seen in the use of d-cycloserine (Hofmann, Otto, Pollack, & Smits, 2014) . For this reason, the use of STC based approaches to putatively strengthen extinction memory warrants caution if applied in a clinical context. For a recent review on these and other approaches for "editing" fear memories, we refer the reader to the recent review by Phelps & Hofmann (2019) .
CHALLENGES IN TRANSLATION

Conceptual challenges
The beauty of human fear conditioning paradigms is their simplicity and possibility to translate across various mammal and non-mammal species, such that molecular and cellular knowledge garnered in other species can be leveraged for developing treatments.
Nevertheless, the paradigm models only some aspects and symptoms of anxiety-related disorders.
For example, for many specific phobias, there is no consistent evidence that they emerge in the way that Watson proposed: an early traumatic experience with the to-be-feared stimulus, including actually aversive consequences to the patient. This is particularly obvious for spider phobia in north-central Europe where poisonous spiders do not exist or are rare. It is unclear what the aversive or traumatic consequence of an early spider encounter should have been for the patient. Although observing one's parent run away from a spider and shout in panic could possibly explain generation of spider phobia, this is not the mechanism proposed by Watson, and is modeled in the laboratory not by fear conditioning but by observational learning paradigms. Despite this, fear conditioning paradigms may still serve to create aversive associations in the laboratory and investigate the success of various extinction techniques for specific phobias.
Furthermore, specific phobias involve symptoms and behavioural phenomena unobserved in fear conditioning paradigms. Among these are the subjective feeling of anxiety but also of other emotional qualities such as disgust (Olatunji, Armstrong, & Elwood, 2017) , simple passive and active avoidance of a feared object (Beckers, Krypotos, Boddez, Effting, & Kindt, 2013) , and the heterogeneous and sometimes sophisticated safety behaviors exhibited by patients in the presence of a feared object (see Blakey et al. (2019) for an example). A crucial challenge for fear conditioning research will therefore be to model the emergence of behavioral tendencies (Krypotos, 2015) as well as of behaviors that are qualitatively different from what healthy people do: for example, patients with spider phobia tend to avoid looking at a (harmless) spider, but in the presence of a poisonous spider this behavior would be a rather dangerous strategy. Another important example is the presence of intrusive memories in PTSD. These are not usually reported in human fear conditioning (although they are also rarely investigated). More naturalistic setups such as the trauma film paradigm (see Holmes & Bourne (2008) for a review and Porcheret, Holmes, Goodwin, Foster, & Wulff (2015) for a contemporary example) experimentally elicit these symptoms.
Developing behavioral or neural markers for intrusive memory in these paradigms could help develop more controlled setups that may eventually even be back-translated to non-human species. As for specific phobias, it must be emphasized that fear conditioning models cannot (and do not claim) to model all processes or mechanisms involved in complex disorders such as PTSD (see Briscione, Jovanovic, & Norrholm, 2014) .
Methodological challenges
Despite apparent similarities in how fear learning is investigated in the laboratory in different species, it is also clear that the translation of fear conditioning findings from other animals to humans faces multiple methodological challenges. For example, rodent and human fear conditioning experiments typically differ in the types of conditioned stimuli (auditory versus mostly visual); the intensity of unconditioned stimuli (typically much lower in human experiments due to ethical constraints); the focus of outcome measures (fear behaviormostly freezing -versus psychophysiological/neural responses/subjective reports); etc.
Furthermore, rodent experiments typically use single-cue protocols across multiple days, whereas human experiments mostly use differential-cue protocols conducted in a single day (see Lonsdorf et al., 2017 , for a comprehensive review). In addition, data reporting practices and analysis approaches vary considerably across animal (Wotjak, 2019) and human (Lonsdorf et al., 2017) fear conditioning studies, which impacts replicability and generalizablity (see Lonsdorf, Merz, & Fullana, 2019) . As in many fields of clinical neuroscience, a generally accepted measurement-theoretic approach to fear conditioning read-outs is lacking, although initial steps have been taken towards calibrating and optimizing learning measures (Bach et al., 2018b) . Addressing these factors will therefore be critical in optimizing the future value of translational research in fear conditioning.
The idea that alterations in basic fear conditioning and/or extinction contribute to etiology or maintenance of anxiety-related disorders is appealing and has high face validity for clinicians. Nevertheless, studies in controlled laboratory circumstances have so far not been able to identify reproducible characteristic alterations in patient groups. A meta-analysis including over 900 anxiety patients and over 1200 controls has revealed an inconsistent pattern despite the very large sample size (Duits et al., 2015) : increased autonomic CSresponses in patients during acquisition, but neither increased CS+ responses nor reduced CS+/CS-differences. During extinction, they observed increased CS+ but not CS-responses, and a non-significantly larger CS+/CS-differences. There are certainly many possible reasons for this inconsistency, including publication bias, inadequate laboratory models, measurement problems, and heterogeneous patient populations with insufficient sample sizes in individual studies. One distinct possibility is that a subtly altered fear learning mechanisms can cope well with everyday threats, including the almost trivial punishments used in laboratory research, such that patient/control differences in laboratory research are weak and inconsistent. However, the system may nevertheless break down when pushed to its dynamic limits, leading to the drastic consequences that patients experience.
Indeed, previous studies have mostly investigated patient-control differences in conditioning or extinction over many trials, or explored patient-control differences in linear changes over trials. However, this analysis approach may not reveal subtle alterations in underlying learning mechanisms. For example, a classical learning theory (Rescorla & Wagner, 1972) would predict that under continuous reinforcement, the trial-by-trial trajectory of learning indices takes an exponential form, where differences in learning rates change the argument of the function. Under partial reinforcement, a learning index would increase by a small amount after reinforcement and decrease by a small amount after non-reinforcement.
The magnitude of change after each trial would depend on learning rates and could be different between patients and controls. Taken together, according to this classical view (and other learning theories), altered learning rates would not necessarily lead to pronounced average differences, or different linear change over trials, between patients and controls.
Notably, different learning theories diverge in their predictions on how alterations in learning rates play out in the trial-by-trial dynamics of learning indices. However, even in healthy humans or animals, these dynamics remain elusive as well. Computational psychology research has only recently begun to scrutinize aversive learning mechanisms.
This has revealed that traditional associative learning models (such as the seminal Rescorla-Wagner (Rescorla & Wagner, 1972) and Pearce-Hall rules (Pearce & Hall, 1980) ) cannot account for fear conditioning and extinction. To reveal this, at least two approaches are used in the field. First, certain qualitative phenomena (such as backward blocking, latent inhibition, or second-order conditioning) are not compatible with traditional learning models (Gershman, 2015) . Notably, it is not fully clear which of these qualitative phenomena can be observed in humans, and by which learning index (see Maes et al., 2016 for failures to observe blocking). The latter point is important because not all learning measures index the same neural learning mechanism. For example, conscious recollection of threat expectation is suggested to index hippocampus-dependent declarative memory rather than amygdaladependent threat memory (Bechara et al., 1995) . The second approach is to compare trial-bytrial trajectories of learning to predictions of several learning models, in order to reveal which learning model best explains the data. Again, the choice of learning index plays a crucial role:
it is not obvious that all learning indices -even if related to the same learning mechanismrelate to the same quantity in the mechanism. For example, skin conductance responses, arguably among the most frequently used human fear conditioning measure, do not appear to relate to US prediction, but rather to some form of uncertainty about this prediction (Li, Schiller, Schoenbaum, Phelps, & Daw, 2011; Tzovara, Korn, & Bach, 2018; Zhang, Mano, Ganesh, Robbins, & Seymour, 2016) .
This line of research has demonstrated that the dynamics of conditioned skin conductance responses are not explained by traditional associative learning models and better explained by a hybrid model combining these two learning models (Li et al., 2011; Tzovara et al., 2018; Zhang et al., 2016) . Next, it was suggested that the dynamics of conditioned skin conductance and pupil size responses are even better explained by a probabilistic model in which learning decays over time (Tzovara et al., 2018) . A probabilistic model can also explain backward blocking and latent inhibition (Gershman, 2015) . However, the formulation of the model in Tzovara et al.(2018) does not allow for extinction, and this will require further research. A class of models that can theoretically capture various learning phenomena including extinction and return-of-fear has been suggested under the heading of "latent cause models" (Gershman, Blei, & Niv, 2010) . These learn structure of the environment and its numerical parameters somewhat independently. It remains to be shown under which range of experimental circumstances these models can explain empirical data. The next step will then be to investigate these models in data from patients with anxiety-related disorders.
A century after John Watson and Rosalie Rayner conducted their seminal study, interest in human fear conditioning models remains alive and well among both neuroscientists and clinicians. Although many challenges lay ahead in the translation of conditioning models for the genuine benefit of patient populations, there are many reasons to be optimistic that this research will continue to critically inform the future optimized treatment of anxiety-related disorders.
